

漏洞

Introduce

Hello auditor, here are some Dlink DNS series machine RCE, which can execute code without auth in specific machines.

influential version

- DNS-320 – Version 1.00
- DNS-320LW – Version 1.01.0914.2012
- DNS-325 – Versions 1.01 and 1.02
- DNS-340L – Version 1.08

influential component

These vulnerabilities belong to `account_mgr.cgi`, which `cmd` parameter (it determines which code branch to run) is:

- `cmd=cgi_chg_admin_pw`
- `cmd=cgi_group_add`
- `cmd=cgi_group_modify`
- `cmd=cgi_chg_admin_pw` (In fact, I believe there are many more vulnerabilities on this machine. I have only scratched the surface, just 1% of it.)

vulnerable details

First thing first, let's unpack the firmware and get to the file: `account_mgr.cgi`, then put it into IDA, we can see `cgiMain()` has so many branches we can go, we need control

```

1 int cgiMain()
2 {
3     char s1[64]; // [sp+Ch] [bp-50h] BYREF
4     int v2; // [sp+4Ch] [bp-10h]
5
6     v2 = check_login();
7     if ( v2 == 1 )
8     {
9         cgiFormString((int)"cmd", (int)s1, 64);
10        if ( !strcmp(s1, "cgi_open_tree") )
11        {
12            cgi_open_tree();
13        }
14        else if ( !strcmp(s1, "cgi_open_new_folder") )
15        {
16            cgi_open_new_folder();
17        }
18        else if ( !strcmp(s1, "cgi_user_add") )
19        {
20            cgi_user_add();
21        }
22        else if ( !strcmp(s1, "cgi_user_list") )
23        {
24            cgi_user_list();
25        }
26        else if ( !strcmp(s1, "cgi_add_session") )
27        {

```


control to execute
which branch

in addition, we don't need to worry about the authentication of `check_login()` (`sub_1CF0C`), because its authentication logic is essentially meaningless. The function `wto_chkTime` will always return a non-zero value(1,2,5,6), which means that even if the user is not logged in, directly accessing the CGI will still cause `check_login` to succeed.

```

x IDA... Pse... Sta... Sta... Sta... Sta... Sta... Sta...
1 int check_login()
2 {
3     int v0; // r5
4     char v2[128]; // [sp+0h] [bp-490h] BYREF
5     char v3[1040]; // [sp+80h] [bp-410h] BYREF
6
7     cgiCookieString("username", v3, 1024);
8     sprintf(v2, "echo '%s' '%s'>/tmp/test", v3, (const char *)cgiRemoteAddr);
9     system(v2);
10    v0 = wto_chkTime(v3, cgiRemoteAddr);
11    sprintf(v2, "echo '%d-----' >/tmp/timeout", v0);
12    system(v2);
13    return v0;
14 }

```



account_mgr.cgi->cgi_chg_admin_pw

we can submit "cmd=cgi_chg_admin_pw" to get to the vulnerable route

```

186     else if ( !strcmp(cmd_param, "cgi_chk_admin_pw") )
187     {
188         cgi_chk_admin_pw();
189     }
190     else if ( !strcmp(cmd_param, "cgi_chg_admin_pw") )
191     {
192         cgi_chg_admin_pw();
193     }
194     else if ( !strcmp(cmd_param, "cgi_nfs_enable") )
195     {
196         cgi_nfs_enable();

```

```

1 size_t cgi_chg_admin_pw()
2 {
3     int v1[513]; // [sp+0h] [bp-8D4h] BYREF
4     char s[128]; // [sp+806h] [bp-CEh] BYREF
5     char s1[2]; // [sp+886h] [bp-4Eh] BYREF
6     char v4[76]; // [sp+888h] [bp-4Ch] BYREF
7
8     cgiFormString((int)"pw", (int)v4, 64);
9     account cmd("account -m -u '%s' -p '%s'", "admin", v4);
10    sprintf(s, "snmp_tool -t %d >/dev/null", 1);
11    system(s);
12    syslog(6, "Admin password has been modified.");
13    xml_get_str("/system_mgr/mail/mail_event/name_pwd_enable", 2, s1);
14    if ( !strcmp(s1, "1") )
15    {
16        memset(v1, 0, 0x800u);
17        v1[1] = 7;
18        Lib_Mail_Connect(v1, 15);
19    }
20    LIB_CP_Config_To_MTD(196644);
21    fwrite("Pragma: no-cache\r\nCache-Control: no-cache\r\n", 1u, 0x2Bu, (FILE *)cgiOut);
22    cgiHeaderContentType("text/xml");
23    fwrite("<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?>\n", 1u, 0x28u, (FILE *)cgiOut);
24    return fwrite("<modify_info><status>1</status></modify_info>\n", 1u, 0x2Eu, (FILE *)cgiOut);
25 }

```

we can submit pw to control the system param

PoC&EXP(sum of the 4-ones vulnerabilities)

the vuln to be tested is determind by vulpoint_template

